The Theory of Relativity (Interdisciplinary Extreme Mode)

compositehiggs

It was my occasional habit in the pre-covid times to crash conferences on the interpretation of quantum mechanics. The field is relatively small and so the conferences are surprisingly welcoming, even if you are a bit of an outsider.

A few years ago I went to a conference in Long Island called “Quantum Mechanics: Paradigm or Ontology of Nature?” where I met one of Fuchs’ grad students (whose name escapes me at the moment.)

I can try to express my problems with qbism in the following way. Consider that special relativity in particular is a relational turn in physics. Einstein’s main idea was to recognize that certain apparent quantities were frame dependent and therefor ontologically suspect (presuming that one’s frame of reference doesn’t matter) while other quantities (perhaps not the obvious ones) were frame invariant. QBism tries to suggest that the outcome of certain experiments has the same character - certain sorts of quantum mechanical measurements give fundamentally frame dependent results which is why different observers can have different accounts of, for instance, when a wave function “collapses”. They would argue that wave function collapse itself is an ill posed idea.

So far so good, I guess.

The issue is that special relativity identifies the true observables (things which transform appropriately under the Lorentz group) and then constructs genuinely new physics out of them. Physics which doesn’t just explain why certain non-invariant quantities look the way they do in certain frames (boring) but also explains why gold is, for example, yellow. That is, identifying the true frame independent quantities leads to a new framework of physics which allows us to calculate new things.

Its this second part that qbism doesn’t seem to offer anything towards. Yeah, its easy to say that measurement outcomes are in general not frame independent in quantum mechanics but that doesn’t really lead us to any new physics (so far). Like I said, I’m pretty sure that Quantum Mechanics is not close enough to a real theory of the world to even be useful as a philosophical tool. I’m also pretty sure that QFT isn’t well understood enough or well posed enough to constitute a genuine basis for philosophical discussion either.

All this seems to be related to gravity, which has its own pile of philosophical problems. I have a totally intuitive hunch that this nut won’t crack until we understand quantum gravity.

CidNight

esper how many sides does the dithligonal heckahedron feel that it has?

compositehiggs

CidNight

Physicists typically think of ontology as related to the question: What are the true, fundamental, degrees of freedom of the universe?

Per my previous post if we have a system of two particles special relativity tells us that the spatial distance between them isn’t such a fundamental degree of freedom because it depends on who measures it. (People moving in certain directions will measure a different distance than those stationary. In fact, what special relativity tells us is that there is no state of affairs whatsoever as to the question of what the distance between two objects is in space.) Instead, special relativity tells us that to find something that works somewhat like a distance but upon which everyone agrees we have to take into account not just the particle positions in space but their “position” in time and that only certain combinations of space and time indexes constitute things we can all agree upon.

compositehiggs

As an aside I sort of hate the way that special relativity is taught because a great deal of energy is spent on marveling at length contraction and time dilation when these things are, in fact, totally non-physical (at least at the level of special relativity). Length contraction and time dilation are totally illusory phenomena entirely a result of your frame of reference and cannot in any way effect the results of experiments.

I will say that at the level of standard quantum mechanics it is 100% clear (to me) that “wave function collapse” is not a physical event.

CidNight

compositehiggs
That’s fascinating and I think I see parallels to the way anthropologists use ontology to think about human relationships and identities. I would say that relational ontology is a relativist or non-essentialist body of theory. This means that it does not posit that humans have any sort of set identity or essential core of identity - and by extension, society does not have inherent, immutable structures. This means that it isn’t necessarily a given that a culture even has a religion, an economy, etc - much less that they have a specific type of these structures as it relates to anything else. This is in direct contrast to traditional anthropological theories of culture that were evolutionary in their approach. Meaning that as a culture becomes more ‘complex’ it must change along a set course. Hunter gatherers must be tribes, agriculturalists must be states. And by extension, individuals within an agricultural state must act a certain way, have a certain type of religion and so on. As with special relativity, anthropologists have become more aware of the great deal of flexibility, fluidity, and yes, subjectivity of the people we study. We have a subjective experience of them, they have a subjective experience of themselves, and none of it is unchanging.

compositehiggs

CidNight

Of course, the “relativity” in the name “special relativity” is sort of historical accident. A name which points more directly at the surprising part of the theory rather than the fundamental elements of it. In the end, special relativity does posit that some quantities are universal and everyone agrees on them.

Even general relativity, which extends the set of quantities which are not frame independent, still identifies what appear to be (at least in the theory) the true, fundamental, degrees of freedom upon which all else supervenes.

I don’t even know how to think about anthropology in these terms: its clear to me that even to be human is an approximate state of affairs (human is a cluster concept in Wittgensteinian terms). It doesn’t seem particularly plausible that there could even be any true ontology of the human experience beyond the underlying ontology of the universe itself.

Can a mod split this stuff off into its own thread?

CidNight

compositehiggs
Certainly anthropologists have thought a lot, at least since the emergence of post-modernism, about what you eloquently called “an approximate state of affairs” vis a vis human essentialism. Unlike philosophers though anthropologists tend to try not to get bogged down in questions like this. Ultimately if you want to study human culture, and human practice within that culture, it does not matter what the “true” nature of the human self is. It only matters how that particular culture, or better still individuals within that culture, perceive themselves to be.

Syzygy

How would you title such a thread?

CidNight

Syzygy Hmmm…

The theory of relativity: Explained! (in multiple disciplines, no less)

tapevulture

yeso completely got it. no problems

yeso

looks like a couple of eggheads need to play pathologic 2

yeso

yeso play pathologic 2

to be more specific: for a portrayal of ontologies ((in the philosophical sense)

antillese

I feel partially responsible for the diversion into quantum mechanics. You are all welcome, mostly because it rules.

CidNight

Nice. Anyone wanna jump in here with like a computer scientist, or librarian science, or world languages perspective?

CidNight

yeso yes it’s definitely on my list. I might even jump into it tonight! I’m pretty seriously considering just doing the like maximum easy mode slider from go though. My bandwidth is low at the moment.